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[259] 
Notes 
The Problem of Reverse Payments in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Following Actavis 
Traci Aoki 
Reverse payments are payments that are made as a component of a patent infringement 
settlement, between a brand-name pharmaceutical company to a competitor who is 
attempting to market a generic version of the patented brand-name drug. The patentee not 
only drops its patent infringement suit against the generic manufacturer, but also 
compensates this alleged infringer. Reverse payment settlements raise antitrust concerns 
because they suggest that the generic manufacturer could have proved the brand-name’s 
patent either invalid or non-infringed, and thus entered the marketplace to provide 
consumers with lower priced generic drugs, if they had continued with the litigation. This 
also insinuates that the motive behind the payment was to persuade the generic 
manufacturer to delay marketing its lower priced drug, and therefore prolong the brand-
name company’s monopoly. By settling with the generic manufacturer, the brand-name 
company is able to continue selling its pharmaceutical at a monopoly-set price, at the 
expense of consumers who are forced to pay higher costs for their medications. 
 
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court held that reverse payment settlements 
sometimes violate antitrust laws, and that each settlement should be reviewed on a case-
by-case basis, under the antitrust rule of reason standard, to determine if it is illegal. 
Under the rule of reason, courts must weigh the procompetitive and anticompetitive 
effects of the settlement to determine whether the payment is reasonable. The Supreme 
Court, however, declined to provide a framework for the rule of reason analysis of 
reverse payment settlements, leaving it to the lower courts to establish. 
 
Following this decision, district courts have diverged greatly in their application of 
Actavis to the reverse payment settlements before them. Some courts believe Actavis 
 
   J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law; M.A., 2013, 
Boston University; B.A., 2011, University of Southern California. I would like to thank the editors of 
the Hastings Law Journal for their invaluable assistance. This Note is dedicated to my parents and 
sister for their unwavering support throughout law school. 
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directs antitrust scrutiny only to settlements involving monetary payment, while others 
believe the holding also applies to noncash settlements. This Note argues that Actavis 
antitrust scrutiny should be applied not only to monetary settlements, but also to 
nonmonetary settlements, because reverse payments can bring a risk of significant 
anticompetitive effects regardless of the particular form of the transfer of value. 
Additionally, this Note proposes a model of analysis to apply when determining whether 
the terms of a nonmonetary settlement violate antitrust law. 
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Introduction: The Problem of Reverse Payments  
in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
One of the most significant economic problems facing Americans 
today is rising healthcare costs.1 A large part of this expenditure stems 
from pharmaceutical purchases. Pharmaceutical spending in 2014 
reached $373.9 billion, a 13.1% increase from 2013.2 Generic versions of 
brand-name pharmaceuticals produce tremendous cost benefits, saving 
consumers, taxpayers, businesses, and federal and state programs 
$239 billion in 2013 alone.3 However, these lower priced options are 
eliminated when pharmaceutical companies engage in reverse payment 
settlements and conspire to keep generics off the market, leaving the 
brand-name drug as consumers’ only option. 
“Reverse payment” or “pay-for-delay” settlements occur when a 
brand-name pharmaceutical company that is suing a generic 
manufacturer for patent infringement drops its lawsuit and instead pays 
the generic company to delay marketing its generic drug until a specified 
date.4 This flow of consideration from the patentee, brand-name 
pharmaceutical company to the generic manufacturer contrasts with that 
of traditional patent infringement settlements, where infringing parties 
pay patentees to drop the lawsuits against them. These reverse payment 
settlements delay both the availability of generic drugs to consumers and 
competition among pharmaceutical companies, raising strong antitrust 
concerns. As reverse payment settlements become increasingly popular 
in the pharmaceutical industry, steps must be taken to combat their 
anticompetitive effects.5 
The main problem with reverse settlements is that the benefits they 
provide for the brand-name pharmaceutical company and the generic 
drug manufacturer are often at the expense of consumers, who are forced 
to pay higher prices for their medications. According to a recent Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) statement, “eliminating these pay-for-delay 
settlements would still save consumers $35 billion over ten years—or 
about $3.5 billion per year.”6 This is because, on average, generic drugs 
 
 1. See Harriet Komisar, The Effects of Rising Health Care Costs on Middle-Class 
Economic Security 1 (2013), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/ 
security/2013/impact-of-rising-healthcare-costs-AARP-ppi-sec.pdf.  
 2. IMS Inst. for Healthcare Informatics, Medicines Use and Spending Shifts: A Review of 
the Use of Medicines in the U.S. in 2014, at 3 (2015). 
 3. See Generic Pharm. Ass’ns, Generic Drug Savings in the U.S. 1 (6th ed. 2014), 
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/GPhA_Savings_Report.9.10.14_FINAL.pdf. 
 4. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 740 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 5. FTC, FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Study 14546 (2011), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission. 
 6. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, FTC, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for 
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cost ten times less than their brand-name counterparts.7 However, these 
savings are lost when the brand-name pharmaceutical company settles 
with the generic manufacturer in order to eliminate the risk of expensive 
litigation that could ultimately invalidate its patent and open the door to 
competition from generic drugs. By delaying the manufacture and sale of 
a version of its drug, the brand-name company is able to maintain its 
monopoly-set price and thus, make more than it and the generic 
challenger would have made combined if they were to compete with each 
other on the market. In an anticompetitive reverse payment settlement, 
the generic company agrees to drop its application to produce a low-cost 
generic version of the drug in exchange for a share of the monopolized 
profits. In such a scenario, where the brand-name and generic drug 
companies conspire to intentionally block competition, their actions 
constitute an antitrust violation. Until FTC v. Actavis, Inc., it was unclear 
whether all reverse payment settlements raised antitrust concerns. 
For years, the federal circuit courts were split on whether reverse 
payment settlements were illegal under antitrust law.8 This conflict was 
finally resolved in Actavis, where the Supreme Court held that, although 
reverse settlements in pharmaceutical patent infringement lawsuits 
should not automatically be deemed illegal, some do violate antitrust 
laws.9 The Court decided that reverse settlements should be reviewed on 
a case-by-case basis, under the antitrust “rule of reason” standard, to 
determine whether they violate antitrust law.10 However, following this 
decision, a sub-issue has caused a divide in lower courts’ application of 
Actavis. Specifically, district courts have come to inconsistent conclusions 
 
Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution), Address Before the Center for American Progress 8 
(June 23, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ 
pay-delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conduct-protect/090 
623payfordelayspeech.pdf). 
 7. See FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions 2 (2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost- 
consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. 
 8. See infra Part II; see, e.g., In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 142206, at *60 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (holding that reverse payment settlements were 
presumptively illegal); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that reverse payment 
settlements only violated antitrust law if they exceeded the exclusionary “scope of the patent,” 
unlawfully extending the patent monopoly); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 
21213 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (advocating the “scope of the patent” test 
when reviewing reverse payment settlements for unlawful anticompetitive effect); In re Cardizem, CD 
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that reverse payments were per se illegal). 
 9. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 10. Id. The rule of reason standard requires courts to weigh a settlement’s anticompetitive effects 
against its procompetitive effects to determine if it violates antitrust law. See infra Part II.C for a 
discussion of the rule of reason standard. This standard was first developed in Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co. v. United States as a legal doctrine used to interpret the Sherman Act, the core of U.S. antitrust 
policy. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
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as to whether Actavis applies to reverse payments with nonmonetary 
settlement terms, or if it is limited only to monetary exchanges.11 While 
many courts have held that the term “reverse payment” is not limited to 
monetary payment,12 other courts have dismissed cases because they 
interpret Actavis to require cash consideration in order to trigger rule of 
reason antitrust scrutiny.13 
This Note explains why reverse payment settlements should not be 
limited to monetary terms and proposes a model for courts to apply 
when determining whether the terms of a nonmonetary settlement 
violate antitrust law. First, Part I summarizes the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and its role in allowing reverse payment settlements and their 
anticompetitive effects to exist. Next, Part II describes the pre-Actavis 
circuit split over the proper antitrust analysis of reverse payment 
settlements. Part III examines the facts and holding of Actavis, as well as 
the rule of reason antitrust standard set forth by the Court. Part IV then 
examines lower courts’ contrasting interpretations of whether Actavis 
and its rule of reason antitrust scrutiny are limited to reverse payment 
settlements involving an exchange of cash. Part V provides support for 
the argument that Actavis’s rule of reason antitrust scrutiny should not 
be limited to monetary settlements. Finally, Part VI proposes a formula 
for applying the Actavis rule of reason analysis to determine whether a 
particular nonmonetary settlement violates antitrust law. 
I.  The Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Role in Anticompetitive Reverse 
Payment Settlements 
In response to rising healthcare and pharmaceutical costs, Congress 
enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”) to expedite the approval process of generic 
drugs. This allows generics to quickly enter the market and reach 
consumers once the patent on the brand-name drug expires.14 However, 
since its passage, the Hatch-Waxman Act has unintentionally enabled 
 
 11. See United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. 
Supp. 3d 1052, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, 
at *60; In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 550 (D.N.J. 2014); In re Niaspan Antitrust 
Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014); In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180 
(D.R.I. 2014); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231 (D. Mass. 2014). 
 12. See United Food, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1069; In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 751; 
In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013).  
 13. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180; In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560 (D.N.J. 2014).  
 14. Jon Leibowitz, FTC, Second Annual In-House Counsel of Forum on Pharmaceutical 
Antitrust: Exclusion Payments to Settle Pharmaceutical Patent Cases; They’re B-a-a-a-ck! 
(2006); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. 
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pharmaceutical companies to enter into anticompetitive reverse 
settlements.15 This negative consequence and the aspects of the Hatch-
Waxman Act that contribute to it will be discussed after the following 
summary of the approval process for generic drugs. 
To begin the expedited approval process for their drug, potential 
generic manufacturers file an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(“ANDA”) in which they assert that their generic drug is “bioequivalent” to 
a brand-name drug that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
has already approved.16 This means that the generic drug contains the 
same active ingredients as the brand-name drug.17 Because the drugs are 
“bioequivalent,” the FDA can simply refer to the safety and efficacy 
findings it previously made during the testing and approval process of the 
brand-name drug when examining the ANDA-filer’s drug.18 By allowing 
generics to bypass expensive and time-consuming drug trials, the ANDA’s 
procedure accelerates the availability of low-cost generic drugs to 
consumers. 
To submit an ANDA, applicants must make one of four “paragraph 
certifications” that their generic product will not infringe the brand-
name’s patents.19 The fourth option, the “paragraph IV certification,” is 
the one involved in reverse settlement cases.20 Under a paragraph IV 
certification, the ANDA applicant either asserts that the brand-name’s 
patent is invalid or that the “manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic 
drug will not infringe the patent.21 Once the generic manufacturer files an 
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, the brand-name patentee has 
forty-five days to attempt to stop the generic from receiving FDA 
approval by filing a patent infringement suit against the generic 
company.22 This patent infringement suit triggers a thirty-month stay 
during which the FDA will not approve the generic drug, and the two 
parties litigate the validity or infringement of the patent.23 
To incentivize generic manufacturers to file paragraph IV ANDA 
applications despite the risk of being sued for patent infringement, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180-days of marketing exclusivity to the first 
generic drug manufacturer to file a paragraph IV ANDA application 
(the generic “first-filer”).24 During this period, the FDA will not approve 
generic drug applications from any other company that would compete 
 
 15. FTC, supra note 5, at 139. 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
 17. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). 
 18. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 19. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 20. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 21. Id. 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012). 
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012). 
 24. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
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with the first generic manufacturer.25 Through this provision, the Hatch-
Waxman Act benefits consumers by encouraging challenges to invalid 
patents and the marketing of noninfringing generics, increasing the 
availability of generic drugs and price competition among pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.26 
However, in reverse payment settlements, the brand-name 
pharmaceutical company “pays” the generic first-filer to stay off the 
market until a specified date. In this scenario, the patentee essentially 
pays the generic company to postpone its 180-day marketing exclusivity 
period, allowing the brand-name manufacturer to stretch out its 
monopoly period. Such arrangements are possible because of the 
Medicare Modernization Amendments Act of 2003, under which the 
generic first-filer’s exclusivity period is not triggered until the generic 
product actually enters the market.27 In exchange for settling, the brand-
name company often agrees not to launch its own generic drug, which 
would otherwise have competed with the generic first-filer’s product 
during its marketing exclusivity period.28 This type of settlement 
provision is called a “no-AG” agreement.29 
An “AG,” or “authorized generic,” is the brand-name manufacturer’s 
own generic version of the patented drug. Although the Hatch-Waxman 
Act prevents other generic companies from entering the market during 
the first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period, it does not exclude the original 
patentee from doing so.30 By releasing its own generic version of the 
drug, the brand-name patentee is able to “recover some of the sales and 
profits it would otherwise lose when a [generic first-filer] begins to 
market and sell its generic.”31 For this reason, a no-AG agreement with 
the brand-name company is a powerful incentive for a generic first-filer 
to delay release of its generic drug. Studies have shown that competition 
from the patentee’s AG generally reduces the generic company’s 
revenues during its 180-day exclusivity period by about fifty percent.32 
Through their reverse payment settlement, the brand-name patentee and 
the generic first-filer are both able to enhance their profits while 
extending the period in which other generics are excluded from the 
market. 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 74142 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 27. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 28. See FTC, supra note 5, at 14546. 
 29. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 567 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 30. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 741. 
 31. Id. 
 32. FTC, supra note 5, at 139. 
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At this stage, the Hatch-Waxman Act plays a key role in the parties’ 
ability to engage in anticompetitive reverse payment settlements. 
Because the generic first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period creates a 
duopoly, the two parties can conspire together to set monopoly-level 
prices without outside competition to hold them in check. 33 Additionally, 
because only the first generic company to file an ANDA is entitled to an 
exclusivity period, other generic companies are less motivated to attempt 
to enter the drug market before the patent’s expiration date.34 Although 
they may believe that either the patent is invalid or their product does 
not infringe the patent, other generic companies are unwilling to risk the 
expense of litigation with the patentee without the incentive of the 180-
day exclusivity period.35 Therefore, the reverse payment settlement 
essentially prevents not only the generic first-filer from entering the 
market, but also all other generic companies from doing so, thus preserving 
the brand-name company’s monopoly. 
When the patentee and the generic challenger agree to a reverse 
payment settlement, the brand-name manufacturer’s patent remains 
intact, and the public does not get the benefit of price competition.36 This 
harms consumers by slowing both generic entry into the marketplace and 
the additional competition the AG could have provided during the 
generic competitor’s 180-day exclusivity period.37 In order to prevent 
pharmaceutical companies from taking advantage of the inadvertent 
loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act and attempting to unlawfully hinder 
competition, it is imperative that suspicious reverse payment settlements 
be examined for violations of antitrust law. 
II.  FTC V. ACTAVIS, INC. 
In 2013, following years of debate and contrasting holdings in regard 
to the legality of reverse payment settlements, the Supreme Court in 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc. ruled that such settlements sometimes violate 
antitrust law, and that they should be examined for unlawful 
anticompetitive effect under the antitrust “rule of reason” standard of 
analysis.38 However, Actavis failed to provide a framework for lower 
courts to use when applying the rule of reason to evaluate reverse 
payments for possible antitrust violations. As a result, lower courts have 
 
 33. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).  
 35. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey P. Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts 
Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Litigation, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 65 (2010).  
 36. FTC, supra note 5, at 139.  
 37. Id. 
 38. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
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diverged greatly in their interpretations and applications of the Actavis 
holding. 
A. Pre-ACTAVIS Circuit Split on Whether Reverse Payment 
Settlements Violated Antitrust Law 
Prior to Actavis, there was a federal circuit split regarding the 
legality of reverse payment settlements. On one side of split, the Sixth 
Circuit held that reverse payments were “per se illegal,”39 and the Third 
Circuit decided that such settlements were “prima facie evidence of an 
unreasonable restraint on trade.”40 The Third Circuit held that the 
defendant has the burden of proving that the patentee’s “payment 
(1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-
competitive benefit.”41 On the other side, the Second and Eleventh 
Circuits, along with the Federal Circuit, adopted a “scope of the patent” 
test.42 Under this test, reverse payment settlements only violate antitrust 
law if they exceed the exclusionary “scope of the patent,”43 by extending 
the patent monopoly.44 This split was finally resolved in Actavis, where 
the Court held that reverse payment settlements are not automatically 
unlawful and should be examined under the antitrust “rule of reason 
test.”45 
B. FTC V. ACTAVIS, INC. 
In Actavis, the FTC brought suit against four pharmaceutical 
companies, alleging that they had “violated the antitrust laws” by 
conspiring in restrain of trade to maintain monopoly-set drug prices and 
share the profits at the expense of consumers.46 Specifically, the FTC 
challenged a reverse payment settlement where the patentee 
pharmaceutical company, Solvay, paid several hundred million dollars to 
three generic companies—Paddock, Par, and Actavis—to delay marketing 
 
 39. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 90506 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 40. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 41. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 218. 
 42. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F. 3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated 
by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (rejecting the scope-of-the-patent test); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 21213 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223; FTC v. Watson 
Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. 
 43. Under the “scope of the patent” test, there is no anticompetitve effect in violation of antitrust 
law as long as competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent. In re K-Dur Antitrust 
Litig., 686 F.3d at 212. In other words, the agreements only violate antitrust law if they “restrict 
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.” Id. at 214 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F. 3d at 1336).  
 44. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 21213, abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. 
 45. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. The FTC is the government entity in charge of protecting 
consumers from anticompetitive business practices in the marketplace. 
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their generic versions of Solvay’s drug AndroGel for approximately nine 
years.47 The FTC argued that by “unlawfully agreeing ‘to share in 
Solvay’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and refrain 
from launching their low-cost generic products to compete with 
AndroGel for nine years,’” the settling parties had violated § 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.48 
Under its settlement with Solvay, Actavis agreed not to release its 
generic until sixty-five months prior to Solvay’s patent expiration date, 
unless another party marketed a generic before that date.49 Additionally, 
Actavis would promote Solvay’s AndroGel to physicians.50 In return, 
Solvay, the patentee, paid $12 million to Paddock, $60 million to Par, and 
$19 million to $30 million to Actavis for the next nine years.51 
Applying the “scope of the patent” test, the Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed the complaint.52 It concluded that the settlement was “immune 
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the 
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”53 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, 
establishing the “rule of reason” as the standard to be used when 
determining if a reverse payment settlement restricts competition in 
violation of antitrust law.54 In doing so, the Court held that “there is 
reason for concern that settlements taking this form tend to have 
significant adverse effects on competition.”55 However, the Court also 
noted that reverse, or “pay-for-delay,” settlements in pharmaceutical 
patent infringement litigation cannot automatically be deemed 
anticompetitive and illegal.56 Rather, reverse settlements must be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis and under the antitrust “rule of reason” 
standard.57 Under the rule of reason standard, courts should evaluate 
 
 47. Id. at 2229. 
 48. Id. at 222930. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2224 (citing FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1289, 1312 (2012)). 
 53. Id. at 2230 (quoting Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312). 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 2231 (reversing Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of FTC’s complaint). The Eleventh 
Circuit had initially reviewed the complaint under the scope-of-the-patent test. Watson Pharms., Inc., 
677 F.3d at 1312. However, following the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Eleventh Circuit will reexamine 
the case under the rule of reason test. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 55. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 56. Id. at 2237. 
 57. Id. at 223738. The rule of reason is a judge-made doctrine that was first developed in 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States and used to interpret the Sherman Antitrust Act that was 
first developed. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). However, since Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, it has 
been deemed the customary standard by which courts ascertain whether conduct violates the Sherman 
Act. 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). 
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both the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of these settlements 
in a balancing test to determine if it violates antitrust law.58 
C. Rule of Reason Analysis 
According to the Court in Actavis, district courts should administer 
a three-part test when examining a reverse payment settlement for 
anticompetitive effect: (1) determine if there was a reverse payment; 
(2) determine if that payment was “large and unjustified;” and (3) apply 
the rule of reason.59 Not all reverse payments require scrutiny for 
antitrust violations under the rule of reason. Rather, “the likelihood of a 
reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its 
size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, 
its independence from other services for which it might represent 
payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”60 In other 
words, only settlements that are both “reverse” and “large and 
unjustified” need to be examined under the rule of reason. Then, if the 
settlement’s anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive ones, 
the settlement likely violated antitrust law, and the FTC is allowed to 
pursue an antitrust claim against the settling parties.61 
The Actavis Court laid out five factors to guide lower courts’ 
analyses when applying the rule of reason and weighing a settlement’s 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects: (1) whether the consideration at 
issue has the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition;” 
(2) whether these anticompetitive consequences will “at least sometimes” be 
“unjustified”; (3) whether the reverse payment “threat[ens] to work 
unjustified anticompetitive harm”; (4) whether an antitrust action is 
administratively feasible; and (5) the parties’ reasons for preferring 
“settlements that include reverse payments.”62 Courts should consider 
each of these factors carefully when determining whether a settlement 
has an overall anticompetitive impact or a procompetitive one. The 
following is a detailed explanation of each of the five factors, including 
examples of the analysis that should go into each of them. 
1. Whether the Consideration at Issue Has the “Potential for 
Genuine Adverse Effects on Competition” 
First, a district court examining a reverse settlement should 
determine whether the settlement terms have the “potential for genuine 
 
 58. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 59. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 223738. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2234. 
 62. Id. at 223437. 
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adverse effects on competition.”63 For example, reverse payments that 
encourage generic challengers to drop viable claims of patent invalidity 
or non-infringement, and thus delay launching their generic products, 
have “a genuine adverse effect on competition.”64 This is because 
settlements with reverse payments postpone consumer access to lower 
priced generic drugs by an average of seventeen months longer than 
patent infringement settlements without such payments.65 These reverse 
payments allow the patentee to maintain the same high price for its 
pharmaceutical by keeping generic competitors off the market. The 
patentee is essentially dividing its monopoly profits with the generic 
challenger. As a result, both settling parties earn more than they would 
have made competing with each other on the market. All of this is 
ultimately at the expense of consumers, raising the cost of life-saving 
medication and preventing a diversity of options. 
2. Whether Anticompetitive Consequences Will “at Least 
Sometimes” Prove Unjustified 
Second, district courts should ask whether there are justifications for 
the anticompetitive consequences of the agreement. For example, a 
payment may be justified if it equals the approximate litigation costs 
avoided by settlement, along with “compensation for other services the 
generic has promised to perform.”66 Other possible justifications, which 
will be further examined in Part IV of this Note, include demonstrating 
that the settlement increased product output, decreased product price, or 
increased consumer choice.67 The settlement may also be justified if the 
generic manufacturer was financially unable to produce and market its 
generic drug without the reverse payment it received from the patentee.68 
3. Whether the Reverse Payment Threatens to Bring About 
“Unjustified Anticompetitive Harm” 
Third, district courts should examine whether the patentee has the 
market power to bring about the anticompetitive harm. Paying large 
settlements to convince others to stay out of the market strongly suggests 
that the brand-name drug manufacturer has the market power to create 
anticompetitive harm by “charg[ing] prices higher than the competitive 
level.”69 The likelihood of the reverse settlement causing anticompetitive 
harm depends on “its size, its scale in relation to the [settling patentee’s] 
 
 63. Id. at 2234 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 46061 (1986)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. FTC, supra note 7, at 4. 
 66. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 223536. 
 67. See infra Part IV. 
 68. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.  
 69. Id. at 2236. 
Aoki_17 (Hamilton_12.15) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:05 PM 
272                                               HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:259 
  
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services 
for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing justification.”70 
4. Whether an Antitrust Action Is Administratively Feasible 
Fourth, the district court should examine whether the settlement is 
so large that it implies the patent is weak.71 “Unexplained large reverse 
payments” might indicate that the patentee has “serious doubts” that the 
patent is strong enough to survive litigation and an examination of its 
validity.72 This in turn suggests that the patentee’s motive for settling with 
the generic company was purely to eliminate the risk of losing its patent-
created monopoly and encountering generic competition, thereby 
preserving its ability to “maintain supracompetitive prices.”73 These are 
unjustified motives for setting that raise antitrust concerns. 
5. The Parties’ Reasons for Preferring “Settlements That Include 
Reverse Payments” 
The fifth factor involves the district courts’ examination of whether 
the parties could have settled in a way that did not involve the use of a 
reverse payment, as well as why they preferred a reverse settlement.74 If 
their motive in choosing such a settlement was to “maintain and to share 
patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other 
justification,” their settlement raises antitrust concerns.75 
Essentially, reverse payment settlements must be reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis, under the antitrust rule of reason standard.76 Under a 
rule of reason analysis, courts must evaluate both the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects of these settlements.77 Although the Actavis Court 
provided five factors to consider when examining reverse payment 
settlements, it declined to create a specific framework for the rule of 
reason analysis. Instead, the Court left it to the lower courts to 
establish.78 Since Actavis, courts have largely varied in their application of 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.; see also In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, 
at *60 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 72. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see also In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *60. 
 75. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 76. Id. at 223738. 
 77. See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why 
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical 
Patent Litigation, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 6263 (2010). 
 78. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (holding that “the structuring of the present rule-of-reason 
antitrust litigation” would be left “to the lower courts”). 
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the holding to the reverse payment settlements before them. For 
instance, some district courts have held that reverse payment scrutiny is 
limited to exchanges of monetary consideration, whereas others have 
disagreed.79 Furthermore, while many courts do agree that nonmonetary 
settlements are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under Actavis, they 
diverge in their application of the rule of reason test. This Note’s 
proposal seeks to address these remaining post-Actavis uncertainties. 
III.  Post-ACTAVIS Circuit Split 
District courts have come to varying conclusions about whether 
Actavis extends antitrust scrutiny to noncash reverse payment 
settlements, or if the holding only applies to monetary settlement terms.80 
Most courts have held that Actavis should be applied broadly to include 
nonmonetary settlements.81 However, other courts have dismissed 
antitrust lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies on the grounds that 
reverse payment settlements devoid of a monetary exchange are not 
reverse payments.82 This discrepancy in the interpretation and application of 
Actavis is evident in the following cases. 
In In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litigation, the District of Rhode 
Island dismissed an antitrust lawsuit because it determined that Actavis 
only applied to monetary settlements.83 The settlement at issue in this 
case involved the generic manufacturer’s agreement to delay launching 
its generic drug until six months before the patent expiration date, in 
exchange for the brand-name manufacturer’s agreement to: (1) not 
launch its AG within the generic manufacturer’s 180 days of exclusivity; 
(2) not license other generics during that exclusivity period; (3) grant the 
generic company a license to market the generic worldwide, starting 
during that period; (4) pay the generic manufacturer annual fees and a 
 
 79. Cf. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 569 (D.N.J. 2014) (“It 
is good jurisprudence that the result flows from the factual source; this Court will not extend the 
holding of Actavis to the non-monetary facts before it.”); cf. In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust 
Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013) (“This Court does not see fit to read into the opinion a 
strict limitation of its principles to monetary-based arrangements alone. Adopting a broader 
interpretation of the word ‘payment,’ on the other hand, serves the purpose of aligning the law with 
modern-day realities.”). 
 80. See Table 1 infra for a summary of the circuit split that has occurred following the Actavis 
decision. 
 81. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02409, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17718, at *17 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2014) (declining to limit the principles in Actavis to monetary 
based arrangements); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding 
that term “reverse payment” is not limited to cash payment). 
 82. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 182 (D.R.I. 2014) (holding 
that Actavis requires cash consideration in order to trigger rule of reason scrutiny); In re Lamictal 
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 Supp. 3d at 56970 (holding that the Supreme Court in Actavis 
considered reverse payment to be limited to an exchange of money). 
 83. See In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 19293. 
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percentage of net sales in connection with the co-promotion of a separate 
drug produced by the patentee; and (5) give the generic manufacturer 
the exclusive right to earn brand sales of a separate drug.84 In granting 
the defendant settling parties’ motion to dismiss, the court interpreted 
Actavis to require actual “cash payment” in order for a reverse payment 
settlement to trigger rule of reason scrutiny and potentially violate 
antitrust law.85 The court held that because the plaintiffs failed to 
“adequately allege[] payment in the form of cash, . . . [they] failed to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”86 Further explaining its 
reasoning, the court stated that if the Supreme Court had intended for 
Actavis to apply to nonmonetary settlements, “it could simply have said 
so,” but instead the Court consciously chose to focus solely on cash 
settlements, with “cash-focused guidance for applying the rule of 
reason.”87 
In contrast, in United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. 
Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held 
that Actavis does apply to nonmonetary reverse settlement terms.88 The 
United Food court did not find the District of Rhode Island’s reasoning 
persuasive, especially with regard to that court’s conclusion that Actavis 
does not apply to nonmonetary settlements because they are “almost 
impossible to measure.”89 Challenging this assertion, the court explained 
that the monetary value of no-AG agreements could be estimated as the 
difference between the generic’s “projected revenues with the agreement” 
and their “projected revenues had they competed with the pioneer’s 
authorized generic” (that is, without the no-AG agreement).90 Therefore, 
the court reasoned that these complaints should not be dismissed merely 
because the reverse payment settlements involved nonmonetary terms, 
and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.91 
Many courts argue that restricting the application of Actavis to only 
cash settlements will allow pharmaceutical patentees to shield payments 
for delayed generic entry from antitrust scrutiny simply by settling in 
nonmonetary terms.92 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re 
Niaspan Antitrust Litigation noted that such limitations on Actavis would 
 
 84. Id. at 186. 
 85. Id. at 19293. 
 86. Id. at 195. 
 87. Id. at 192. 
 88. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 
3d 1052, 106970 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 89. Id. at 1069. 
 90. Id. at 1071. 
 91. Id. at 107172. See infra Part VII for further discussion on the conversion of noncash 
settlements to monetary values. 
 92. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
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permit settling parties to “cloak reverse payments . . . under the guise of 
compensating” for such terms as co-promotion and manufacturing 
agreements, to ensure the challenger does not market a generic version 
of their drug or challenge the validity of their patents.93 This would allow 
the patentee to surreptitiously, yet unlawfully, maintain its monopoly-set 
prices at the expense of consumers—the very scenario Actavis was trying 
to prevent. 
Meanwhile, reaching a compromise between the two views, other 
courts have held that plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive conduct by the 
two settling parties must convert the noncash terms into a monetary 
value before examining the settlement for anticompetitive effect.94 For 
example, the District of New Jersey dismissed the suit in In re Lipitor 
Antitrust Litigation because the plaintiffs had failed to provide a reliable 
estimate of the values of the nonmonetary settlement terms.95 Although 
Actavis never explicitly stated that reverse payments were limited to 
cash, the Court did emphasize monetary payments in its holding.96 
Therefore, some courts assert that when applying Actavis to analyze a 
settlement, the nonmonetary payment should be converted to a “reliable 
estimate of its monetary value,” so that courts can analyze it using the 
Actavis factors.97 
Despite its apparent focus on monetary settlements in its decision, it 
seems unlikely that the Actavis Court intended its holding to only apply 
to monetary reverse payments to the exclusion of nonmonetary settlement 
terms. Restricting antitrust scrutiny to solely monetary settlements would 
hinder Actavis from fully achieving the Court’s goal of protecting 
consumers from the higher drug prices that result from these 
anticompetitive business practices. If the holding of Actavis does not 
apply to nonmonetary reverse payment settlements, then pharmaceutical 
companies can escape liability for antitrust violations simply by 
structuring their settlements to avoid monetary terms. Therefore, it is 
important that the reverse payment scrutiny be extended to nonmonetary 
settlement terms as well as to monetary ones. 
 
 
 93. Id. at 752. 
 94. See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *62 
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 550 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 95. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d at 550. 
 96. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 223536 (2013). 
 97. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *62. 
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Table 1: Summary of Post-ACTAVIS Circuit Split 
Case District 
Reverse Payment 
Settlement Decision 
Holding Regarding 
Nonmonetary 
Settlement Terms 
In re 
Effexor98 
D.N.J. No-AG agreement 
The case was dismissed in 
part. 
Plaintiffs bringing 
the complaint must 
convert noncash terms 
into a monetary value. 
In re 
Lipitor99 
D.N.J. Side deals
100
 
The case was dismissed 
because the complaint must 
include reliable cash value of 
nonmonetary payment. 
Plaintiffs bringing 
the complaint must 
convert noncash terms 
into a monetary value. 
In re 
Lamictal
101 
D.N.J. No-AG agreement 
The case was dismissed 
but is now on appeal in the 
Third Circuit. 
Actavis is limited to 
monetary-based 
settlements. 
In re 
Nexium102 
D. Mass. 
No-AG agreement 
and side deals
103
 
The defendants’ motions 
for summary judgment 
were granted in part and 
denied in part. 
Actavis applies to 
nonmonetary 
settlements. 
In re 
Loestrin104 
D.R.I.  
No-AG agreement, 
side deals,
105
 and 
licenses to the 
generic manufacturer 
The case was dismissed 
but is now on appeal in the 
First Circuit. 
Actavis is limited to 
monetary-based 
settlements. 
In re 
Aggrenox 
Antitrust 
Litig.106 
D. 
Conn. 
No-AG agreement, 
co-promotion, and 
side deals 
The defendants’ motions 
to dismiss were partially 
denied. 
Actavis applies to 
nonmonetary 
settlements. 
United 
Food107 
N.D. Cal. 
No-AG agreement 
and $96 million in 
free product 
The defendants’ motion 
to dismiss was denied. 
Actavis applies to 
nonmonetary 
settlements. 
In re 
Niaspan108 
E.D. Pa. 
Cash payment, no-AG 
agreement, Supply and 
co-promotion 
agreements 
The defendants’ motion to 
dismiss on grounds that term 
“reverse payment” is limited to 
cash payments was denied. 
Actavis applies to 
nonmonetary 
settlements. 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523. 
 100. The side deals in Lipitor included overseas licensing rights and settlement of overseas 
litigation, as well as litigation concerning a separate product unrelated to the underlying patent. Id. at 
54142. 
 101. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 102. In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231 (2014). 
 103. The side deals in In re Nexium included: (1) “Distribution Agreements,” under which the 
generic company would distribute authorized generic versions of other drugs owned by the patentee; 
(2) an agreement under which the generic company would store some of the patentee’s products; (3) a 
“Supply Agreement,” under which the generic company would provide the patentee with supplies of 
the “active pharmaceutical ingredient” in the patented drug; and (4) an agreement by the generic to 
supply the patentee with quantities of the patented pharmaceutical drug. Id. at 26162. 
 104. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180 (D.R.I. 2014). 
 105. The side deals in In re Loestrin included a promise not to license other generics for a certain 
period and licenses and co-promotion agreements involving other drugs owned by the brand-name 
company that were not related to the underlying patent. Id. at 186. 
 106. In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634 (D. Conn. 
Mar. 23, 2015). 
 107. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 
3d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 108. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
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IV.  Reverse Settlement Scrutiny Should Not Be Limited to 
Monetary Settlements 
Since Actavis the question of whether the Court intended its holding 
to apply solely to monetary reverse payments, or to all forms of reverse 
payment settlements, including nonmonetary ones, has been strongly 
debated. This Part argues that the holding of Actavis should also apply to 
nonmonetary settlement terms, since such terms are just as capable of 
producing anticompetitive effects as monetary ones by persuading 
generic companies to drop their patent challenges and keep their lower 
priced drugs off the market. 
Another reason antitrust scrutiny should extend to nonmonetary 
agreements is that pharmaceutical companies are increasingly 
incorporating noncash terms into their settlements.109 The FTC has 
reported that the frequency of nonmonetary terms, such as no-
authorized-generic (“No-AG”) provisions,110 in reverse payment 
settlements is growing. Illustrating this point, in 2012, nineteen out of 
forty potential reverse payment settlements included a no-AG agreement.111 
This means that nearly half of all reverse payment settlements in 2012 
incorporated the most popular nonmonetary term. If Actavis is only 
applied to monetary reverse payment settlements, at least half of all 
pharmaceutical reverse settlements will escape antitrust scrutiny. 
In response to the rising settlement trend involving nonmonetary 
terms, many district courts have held that reverse payment scrutiny 
should not be limited to monetary exchanges.112 Rather, it should be 
broadly applied to include “anything of value to the generic that can 
induce it to ‘give up the patent fight’” and delay launching its product.113 
Following this perspective, settlement provisions such as no-AG 
agreements should qualify as “reverse payments” because they have 
“tremendous value to the generic manufacturer.”114 The generic’s 180-
day marketplace exclusivity that no-AG agreements protect can be 
worth “several hundred million dollars” to the generic company.115 
 
 109. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 19394. 
 110. FTC, supra note 5, at 2. 
 111. Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission Under 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of 
Agreements Filed in FY 2012, at 1 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/ 
130117mmareport.pdf. 
 112. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 223536 (2013)). 
 113. Id.; see also Payments, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “payments” as 
“performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in 
partial or full discharge of the obligation”). 
 114. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 750. 
 115. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
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Meanwhile, brand-name manufacturers could enhance their own profits 
by six percent to twenty-one percent during the 180-day exclusivity 
period by marketing their own AG—that is, if they do not enter a no-AG 
agreement with the generic company.116 Indeed, many of these settlement 
terms work “exactly as would a payment of cash.”117 Similarly to other 
anticompetitive strategies, no-AG provisions lead generic manufacturers 
to “agree to a later entry date than [they] would otherwise agree to in 
order to settle a patent-infringement case.”118 Therefore, it seems logical 
to extend antitrust scrutiny to these types of nonmonetary terms. 
In considering whether Actavis applies to nonmonetary payments or 
is restricted to only cash settlements, it is important to note that the 
Supreme Court’s main concern when deciding the case was whether 
there were “genuine adverse effects on competition.”119 As explained 
earlier, nonmonetary terms often perform the same function as monetary 
terms, incentivizing generic companies to drop their patent validity 
challenges and agree to delay launching their generic drugs. If Actavis is 
only applied to monetary settlements, pharmaceutical companies can 
engage in anticompetitive activity yet escape antitrust liability simply by 
disguising their conduct under the shield of nonmonetary settlements.120 
It is especially important to expand antitrust scrutiny to nonmonetary 
agreements because pharmaceutical patent settlements are increasingly 
taking on “unconventional, noncash forms,” in a surreptitious attempt to 
escape antitrust scrutiny.121 Therefore, both monetary and nonmonetary 
reverse payment settlements should be reviewed under Actavis for 
unlawful restraints on competition. 
V.  Determining Whether Nonmonetary Settlement Terms  
Violate Antitrust Law 
To provide guidance for how courts should determine whether a 
nonmonetary reverse payment settlement’s terms violate antitrust law, 
this Note proposes the following four-step model of analysis.122 First, the 
plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive activity (generally, the FTC, consumers 
of the involved pharmaceutical drug, or other interested parties) must 
 
 116. FTC, supra note 5, at 62. 
 117. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 752. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. 
 120. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 193 (D.R.I. 2014) (holding 
that in limiting Actavis to cash payments, pharmaceutical companies “are likely to evade Sherman Act 
scrutiny so long as [they] take the obvious care to structure their settlements in ways that avoid cash 
payments”). 
 121. Id. at 19394; see also FTC, supra note 5, at 14546 (concluding that no-AG agreements are 
increasingly common as “compensation to generics for restrictions on entry”). 
 122. See supra Figure I. 
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calculate the monetary value of all noncash settlement terms.123 Second, 
the plaintiffs must approximate the litigation costs the patentee and 
generic challenger avoided by settling.124 Under this Note’s proposed 
standard, if the reverse payment value is less than or equal to the avoided 
litigation costs, then the reverse settlement would escape further 
antitrust scrutiny and the complaint should be dismissed. However, if the 
settlement value exceeds the avoided litigation costs, then the burden 
shifts to the settling parties—that is, the brand-name patentee and the 
generic ANDA filer—to prove that the large payment is justified, either 
by “other services”125 provided to the patentee by the generic 
manufacturer or other “valid, reasonable justifications.”126 
If the settlement included payment for other services conferred by 
the generic challenger, such as supplying the patentee with raw materials 
to manufacture its drugs, or serving as a back-up supplier for the brand-
name company’s products, then the defendants must show that the value 
of these services makes up for the discrepancy between the reverse 
payment and the avoided litigation costs. This is the third step of this 
Note’s proposed model of analysis. In rebuttal, the plaintiffs may provide 
evidence that the generic services in the agreement were not actually 
rendered, or that the payment exceeded the market value of those 
services, thus suggesting that these settlement terms were made merely 
as a cover for unlawful reverse payments in an attempt to restrict 
competition. 
If the monetary value of the reverse payment is approximately equal 
to the sum of the avoided litigation costs and the market value of services 
actually provided by the generic manufacturer, the settlement should 
escape further examination and the complaint should be dismissed. 
However, if the payment greatly exceeds the market value of what the 
brand-name company truly received, the two settling parties have the 
burden of either: (1) proving that their settlement terms are justified; or 
(2) demonstrating that the patentee pharmaceutical company had a high 
likelihood of prevailing in the underlying infringement lawsuit. This is 
the fourth and final step of this Note’s proposed model of analysis. If the 
settling defendants are unable to meet their burden on either alternative, 
their settlement will be deemed anticompetitive and therefore, in violation 
of antitrust law.127 
 
 
 
 123. See infra Part V.A. 
 124. See infra Part V.B. 
 125. See infra Part V.C. 
 126. See infra Part V.D. 
 127. See infra Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Proposed Model for Applying ACTAVIS to  
Nonmonetary Reverse Payments 
 
 
A. Step 1: The Plaintiffs Must Calculate the Monetary Value of 
All Noncash Settlement Terms. 
Under this proposed model, the plaintiffs, that is, the parties 
alleging the anticompetitive behavior between the settling patentee and 
generic manufacturer have the burden of first determining the value of 
each nonmonetary settlement term in the agreement at issue. This step is 
crucial because it will allow the court to later decide if the reverse 
payment was “large and unjustified,” and thus carried “the risk of 
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significant anticompetitive effects.”128 The plaintiffs must include these 
settlement term values, as well as a reliable foundation that supports 
these particular values, in the complaint. If the plaintiffs are unable to 
fulfill their burden, the suit cannot move forward. The reason for this is 
that without reliable values, the court is unable to determine whether the 
settlement truly was “large and unjustified,” as well as whether it was 
“reverse.” Indeed, many post-Actavis courts have agreed that all noncash 
terms must be converted to a monetary value in order to enable proper 
analysis of reverse payment settlements.129 
When bringing their complaint, plaintiffs must calculate the value of 
all consideration the alleged generic infringer received as part of the 
settlement. This consideration may include such nonmonetary terms as 
forgiving a debt (such as damages from a separate patent infringement 
case for a different patent involving the same two parties), no-AG 
agreements (the most common noncash settlement term), granting rights 
in foreign markets, early entry (that is, delaying marketing of the generic 
while still allowing marketplace entry prior to the patent expiration 
date), and payment for unrelated services supposedly provided by the 
generic company. 
When estimating the value of a nonmonetary agreement term, the 
plaintiffs must produce a “reliable foundation supporting that value,” 
including an explanation of how they had calculated the payment 
value.130 One example of a case dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to 
fulfill this burden is In re Effexor XR Antritrust Litigation.131 In this case, 
the plaintiffs calculated the settlement as the sum of the values of an 
eleven-month no-AG agreement and an allowed generic entry date prior 
to the patent expiration date, minus the sum of the avoided litigation 
costs and the royalties the generic challenger would pay the brand-name 
manufacturer during its eleven months of exclusivityin other words, 
the duration of the eleven-month no-AG agreement.132 However, the 
court dismissed the antitrust violation claim because the plaintiffs had 
not adequately established a reliable foundation that supported the 
settlement values that their complaint relied on.133 Without reliable 
values, the court could not determine the direction of the payment, 
 
 128. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 129. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 
74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that in order to decide whether a term is a “large 
and unjustified payment,” courts “must be able to calculate its value”); see also  In re Effexor XR 
Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479 2014, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *66 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (holding that 
“when an alleged reverse payment involves” nonmonetary terms, it “must be valued in terms of a 
monetary amount in order to determine if it is ‘large’ within the meaning of Actavis”). 
 130. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *69. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *71. 
 133. Id. at *7173. 
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meaning whether the net value was directed in “reverse,” toward the 
generic manufacturer, or whether the settlement value was “large” and 
“unexplained.”134 
In another example, the settlement in United Food & Commercial 
Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc. involved the brand-
name company giving the generic manufacturer $96 million in brand 
product, as well as agreeing to not launch its own authorized generic 
drug during the generic company’s 180-day exclusivity period.135 Because 
the agreement “plausibly incentivized [the generic challenger] to accept 
an entry date later than it otherwise would have—which is precisely the 
harm that Actavis sought to prevent,” the court held that the no-AG 
agreement had value.136 Indeed, a no-AG agreement is very valuable to 
generic manufacturers because the “vast majority of [their] potential 
profits . . . materialize during the 180-day exclusivity period.”137 
The value of a no-AG agreement, the most common noncash 
settlement term, should be estimated as the difference between the 
generics’ “projected revenues with the no-AG agreement” and their 
“projected revenues had they competed with the pioneer’s authorized 
generic” (that is, without the no-AG agreement).138 To calculate this 
latter value, the plaintiffs must determine both the market share 
percentage that the brand-name company would lose to the generic 
company upon generic entry and the “retail price of generic drugs during 
180-day exclusivity periods, with and without the presence of an AG on 
the market.”139 According to a recent FDA study, the first generic to hit 
the market can “capture [eighty percent] of the brand-name’s market 
share” and sell at ninety percent of the brand-name’s price.140 However, 
the availability of a second generic, such as an AG, results in the first 
generic only capturing around forty percent of the market, and lowers 
the [generic] drug’s price to fifty-two percent of the brand-name’s.”141 
Using such data, plaintiffs can calculate a reliable estimate of the value of 
the no-AG agreement at issue, as well as that of any other nonmonetary 
settlement terms. Once the plaintiff determines the monetary value of 
 
 134. Id.  
 135. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 
3d 1052, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 136. Id. at 1074. 
 137. Letter from Kathleen Jaegar, President & CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass’n, to Donald S. Clark, 
Sec’y of the Comm’n of FTC 2 (June 27, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_comments/2006/06/062806gpha.pdf. 
 138. United Food, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.  
 139.  In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *71. 
 140. Id. at *12. 
 141. FTC, supra note 5, at 58; see also Carl W. Hittinger & M. Mitchell Oates, ‘Actavis’ Still 
Raising More Questions Than It Answers, Legal Intelligencer, May 4, 2015, at 3. 
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each settlement term and presents a reliable foundation for these values, 
they must then determine the avoided litigation costs. 
B. Step 2: The Plaintiffs Must Determine the Avoided Litigation 
Costs. 
Litigation costs avoided by the settlement must be factored into this 
analysis because they provide a justifiable motive for the reverse 
payment. These expenses include fees of outside and local counsel, 
exhibit preparation, analytical testing, expert witnesses, paralegal services, 
fees for court reporters, and jury advisors.142 According to a recent survey 
of intellectual property litigation costs, patent litigation costs an average 
of $2.8 million when there is $1 million to $25 million in controversy and 
$6 million where there is more than $25 million at issue.143 While the 
median cost of patent litigation is $4.5 million,144 patentees often spend 
more than this median amount when trying to uphold their patents.145 
Additionally, patent infringement litigation can cost generic companies 
“as much as $10 million per suit.”146 
Upon receiving the complaint, the court should compare the 
estimated avoided litigation costs against the total value of the reverse 
payment, both of which will be acquired from reliable sources and 
included in the complaint by the plaintiffs. Under this proposed test, if 
the reverse payment value is less than or equal to the avoided litigation 
costs, the settlement will escape further judicial scrutiny and the 
complaint will be dismissed. The reason for this is that an attempt to 
avoid incurring additional legal fees associated with ongoing litigation is 
a well-founded reason for settling a lawsuit. However, if the settlement 
value exceeds the avoided litigation costs, this suggests that the parties’ 
motives for settling were not legitimate, but instead a bribe by the brand-
name company to the generic manufacturer, to delay marketing its 
generic drug. Therefore, the burden then shifts to the settling parties 
(that is, the patentee pharmaceutical company and the generic 
manufacturer) to prove that the large payment is justified by “other 
services” provided to the patentee by the generic manufacturer. 
 
 142. Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey 34 (2013). 
 143. Id. 
 144. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d, 523, 546 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing C. Scott Hamphill, 
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, N.Y.U L. Rev. 
1553, 1623 n.89 (2006)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 224344 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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C. Step 3: The Defendants Must Ascertain the Value of “Other 
Services” Provided by the Alleged Generic Infringer to the 
Patentee. 
The Actavis Court held that payments are “justified” when they 
reflect “traditional settlement considerations,” such as “avoided 
litigation costs or fair value for services” provided to the brand-name 
company by the generic challenger.147 Thus, the next step is to calculate 
the market value of services rendered by the generic company and to 
compare that amount to any discrepancy between the total value of the 
reverse payment settlement and the avoided litigation costs. The settling 
parties have the burden of calculating this amount and showing that the 
value of the “other services” provided by the generic company makes up 
for the difference between the values of the reverse payment and 
avoided litigation costs. Examples of other services that generic 
companies might provide include: supplying the patentee with raw 
materials or finished pharmaceuticals, helping to promote the brand-
name manufacturer’s products (to doctors), and serving as a ready 
backup supplier for the brand-name company’s products.148 Other 
payments may also include development fees for unrelated products that 
the generic will produce for the patentee.149 
However, when determining the value of “other services” included 
in the settlement, only the market values of those services that were 
actually provided, versus merely promised but not performed, should be 
considered. Additionally, this appraisal should be based on the fair 
market value of the services rendered. These distinctions are important 
because the FTC has reported settlements where some of the services 
agreed upon were not actually provided, or the amount paid to the 
generic company far exceeded the market value of the products and 
services it had supplied to the brand-name company.150 This implies that 
the payments were not truly for those listed products and services, but 
rather for the generic company’s agreement to stay out of the 
marketplace. The settling parties included the generic services in their 
agreement merely as an attempt to shield their unlawful anticompetitive 
behavior. 
Yet, even when the defendants do produce evidence that the fair 
market value of the generic company’s “other services” make up for the 
price discrepancy, the plaintiffs may submit evidence of their own to 
 
 147. Id. at 2237. 
 148. Bureau of Competition, FTC, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission 
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Summary 
of Agreements Filed in FY 2006, at 45 (2007). 
 149. Id. 
 150. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 106061 (2003). 
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rebut it, attacking the necessity of those services. Considering the 
necessity of the generic’s services will help the court determine whether 
the settlements are legitimate agreements or were entered into merely to 
keep competing generic products off the market and maintain the 
patentee’s monopoly.151 Evidence indicating a lack of necessity may 
include the patentee’s failure to request sales projections or reports from 
the generic, or the patentee’s lack of concern when the generic suspends 
work on the project.152 Side deals that are “expressly contingent” on the 
generic staying off the market also raise suspicions of anticompetitive 
intent.153 However, evidence that the brand-name company had already 
been “seeking this type of business opportunity” prior to the settlement 
suggests that the side deal was necessary, and thus weighs in favor of the 
settling parties.154 Such evidence might include internal documents from 
before the settlement date, in which the brand-name company discussed 
pursuing similar services.155 The court should take all evidence related to 
the side deals’ necessities into consideration when determining if the 
services make up for the difference between the value of the reverse 
payment and the avoided litigation costs. 
In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation presents an example of a reverse 
payment settlement that involved suspicious side deals. In the settlement, 
the brand-name manufacturer paid the generic challenger to co-promote 
two drugs to women’s health doctors and serve as a ready back-up 
supplier.156 However, the settlement also required the generic to delay 
marketing its drug until a specified date.157 The In re Niaspan court 
agreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the settlement was unlawful 
given three critical findings.158 First, the brand-name manufacturer did 
not need the standby services of the generic manufacturer.159 Second, the 
Co-Promotion Agreement required the patentee to pay royalties based 
on a percentage of all sales of Niaspan and Advicor, even though the 
generic company was only promoting the products to women’s health 
doctors.160 Finally, the standby payment far exceeded the value the 
generic company was providing as a ready-to-manufacture supplier.161 
Even more indicative of anticompetitive behavior, each term in the 
 
 151. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 152. In re Schering-Plough. Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 1051. 
 153. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 753; see also Hittinger & Oates, supra note 
141, at 23. 
 154. Hittinger & Oates, supra note 141, at 2. 
 155. Id. 
 156. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 744. 
 157. Id. at 745. 
 158. Id. at 752. 
 159. Id. at 75253. 
 160. Id. at 753. 
 161. Id. 
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agreement was “expressly contingent on the generic manufacturer’s 
promise to delay generic entry.”162 For all these reasons, the In re 
Niaspan court held that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged the existence 
of a reverse payment for delayed entry with no legitimate procompetitive 
justification,” and that “but for the anticompetitive settlement 
agreements, the generic manufacturer would have prevailed in the 
underlying patent litigation against the patentee.”163 In other words, the 
settling parties in In re Niaspan had failed to meet their burden of 
showing that the market value of “other services” provided by the 
generic company made up for the discrepancy between the values of the 
reverse payment and avoided litigation costs. Therefore, their motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint against them was denied.164 
However, if the settling parties are able to fulfill their burden of 
proving that the value of “other services” provided by the generic makes 
up for the discrepancy between the reverse payment and avoided 
litigation costs, unlike the defendants in In re Niaspan, the burden shifts 
to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs must then demonstrate that the generic 
services were not actually provided, were not truly needed by the 
patentee, or were overpaid for based on their market value. If the 
plaintiffs satisfy this burden, the defendants must then prove “valid 
justifications” for their settlement terms. 
D. Step 4: Defendants’ Burden of Proving “Valid, Convincing 
Justifications” for Their Settlement Terms 
If the value of the reverse payment exceeds the combined value of 
avoided litigation costs and services provided by the generic company, 
the settling parties have one last chance to prove that their settlement 
terms are justified. Alternatively, they could justify their settlement by 
showing that the patentee had a high likelihood of prevailing in the 
underlying patent infringement lawsuit, which suggests the settlement 
actually had an overall procompetitive effect. This proposition is 
supported by Actavis. 
Consistent with the Court’s analysis in Actavis, the defendants will 
have the burden of demonstrating a “legitimate justification” for the 
settlement terms.165 “Valid justifications” for reverse settlements include 
“avoided cost of litigation, payments for other services provided by the 
generic challenger to the patentee company, and “any other convincing 
justifications.”166 However, the Actavis Court left the interpretation of 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). 
 166. Id. at 2237. 
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what “other convincing justifications” may include to the lower courts to 
decide. 
One justification the defendants could attempt to use to validate 
their settlement is the early generic entry date their agreement provided. 
The earlier the generic entry date, the greater the settlement’s 
procompetitive effect, because it brings lower priced generic drugs to 
consumers before the patent’s expiration date. During settlement, the 
brand-name patentee and the generic company negotiate a date of 
generic entry that will fall somewhere between immediate entry and the 
patent’s expiration date. This date is based on each party’s assessment of 
its relative strengths in the infringement litigation and “their judgments 
of the likely outcome of the suit.”167 For instance, if the patent is strong 
and the brand-name pharmaceutical company has a high likelihood of 
winning the litigation, the generic entry date will be later than if the 
patent is weak and it seems the generic company will prevail. 
However, the problem with reverse payment settlements is that they 
compel generic companies to accept a later entry date than they would 
have agreed to based “solely on the estimated strength of [their] 
litigation position.”168 Therefore, plaintiffs may rebut the settling parties’ 
defense that their settlement was procompetitive by submitting evidence 
that the generic challenger would have entered the market even earlier if 
it were not for the reverse payments it received from the brand-name 
manufacturer. 
Illustrating such a rebuttal, the plaintiffs in United Food successfully 
presented evidence that the generic manufacturer would have launched 
its generic product at an earlier date “at-risk”—that is, as soon as it 
obtained FDA approval—had it not been for the reverse payment it 
received from the brand-name patentee.169 First, the generic company 
had “increased production capacity” and purchased the raw materials 
necessary to start marketing its product, in anticipation of the launch.170 
Second, the large settlement the generic manufacturer was able to 
procure suggested the patentee’s fear that it would launch the generic 
drug at-risk.171 Based on this evidence, the court held that the settling 
parties had “not demonstrated procompetitive effects sufficient to offset 
the alleged injury to competition under the rule of reason analysis.”172 
Rather, the settlement had an anticompetitive effect because the generic 
 
 167. Id. at 223334. 
 168. Id. 
 169. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 
3d 1052, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 170. Id. at 1074. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1075. 
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company would have released its generic product but for the payment of 
$96 million in brand product.173 
Courts have suggested a number of possible justifications by settling 
parties for their reverse payments, including a demonstration that the 
settlement value was less than the profits the generic would have earned 
upon winning the paragraph IV litigation and marketing its generic drug, 
or that the settlement increased product output, decreased product price, 
or increased consumer choice.174 Additionally, various scholars have also 
suggested possible justifications for seemingly large reverse payments, 
such as the generic manufacturer’s financial inability to produce and 
market its drug without a reverse payment from the patentee.175 Other 
proposed justifications are risk aversion and the settling parties’ differing 
views about their chances of prevailing in litigation.176 
As an alternative to justifying their settlement terms, the defendant 
parties can fulfill their burden by proving that the patentee drug 
manufacturer would have likely prevailed in the underlying patent 
infringement lawsuit. Courts have commented that large, unexplained 
reverse payments are a strong indicator of a patent’s weakness and that 
the generic challenger would have succeeded in invaliding that patent 
had they continued litigation instead of settling and accepting the 
patentee’s reverse payment.177 By showing that the patentee would have 
likely prevailed, the settling parties eliminate this presumption. This 
proves that the reverse payments did not prolong a monopoly the 
patentee would have lost through continued litigation, and suggests that 
the settlement’s procompetitive effects outweigh its negative effects. 
Any settlement that allows a generic to enter the market prior to a 
valid patent’s expiration date, even if that entry date is still far into the 
future, has an overall procompetitive effect that benefits consumers.178 
This is because without the agreement, the generic drug would not be 
released until the patent’s expiration.179 For this reason, settling parties 
should be given the opportunity to justify their choice to enter into a 
 
 173. Id. at 1068. 
 174. Id. at 1067. 
 175. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts 
Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Litigation, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 114 (2010). 
 176. Barry C. Harris et al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 Antitrust 83 (2014). 
 177. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236–37 (2013); see, e.g., United Food, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 
1072 (holding that unexplained, large payments may suggest that generic challenger would have 
prevailed had they continued litigation, proving either that patent was invalid or not infringed by its 
generic product). 
 178. See Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 19 Annals Health L. 367, 376–77 (2010). 
 179. Id. 
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settlement, even when it appears on first glance that the payment to the 
generic is unduly large. As mentioned by courts and scholars discussing 
this issue, antitrust scrutiny cannot be applied too strictly to reverse 
payments settlements. Strict antitrust scrutiny would prevent an “easy 
way out” of litigation for companies who attempt to legitimately market 
a generic drug but are sued by a patentee brand-name company for 
patent infringement.180 If strict antitrust scrutiny were applied, the 
generic company would be forced to either proceed with expensive 
litigation or drop its pursuit of marketing a generic entirely.181 This result 
would reduce the Hatch-Waxman Act’s effectiveness at promoting 
generic challenges to invalid patents and increasing the availability of 
lower priced generic drugs to consumers. 
Therefore, if the settling defendants are able to fulfill this burden 
and provide a valid justification for their settlement terms or prove the 
patentee likely would have prevailed in the underlying patent infringement 
suit, the complaint alleging unlawful anticompetitive conduct will be 
dismissed. However, if the settling defendants are unable to meet their 
burden, their settlement will be deemed anticompetitive and in violation 
of antitrust law. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Actavis did not intend to limit antitrust scrutiny to 
reverse payment settlements with monetary terms. Courts that interpret 
Actavis in this way are creating a loophole for pharmaceutical 
companies, allowing them to engage in anticompetitive behavior by 
simply structuring their settlements to avoid cash payments. There is 
already an increasing trend of unconventional, nonmonetary terms in 
settlements between brand-name patentees and generic manufacturers. 
To prevent these pharmaceutical companies from engaging in 
anticompetitive behavior, the Actavis rule of reason antitrust test cannot 
be applied solely to cash settlements. Intentionally anticompetitive 
agreements that prolong monopolies and hinder competition, with no 
significant procompetitive effect, are the exact type of behavior the 
Actavis Court sought to eliminate. To fulfill the intent of the Court, the 
holding of Actavis should be applied to both monetary and nonmonetary 
settlements. 
However, until the Supreme Court decides to reexamine the issue of 
pharmaceutical reverse payment settlements and provide further 
guidance to its antitrust rule of reason analysis, the uncertainties, 
 
 180. See FTC v. Abbvie Inc., No. 14-5151, 2015 LEXIS 59115, at *16 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2015); 
Allison A. Schmidt, Competition Ahead? The Legal Landscape for Reverse Payment Settlements After 
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 493, 515–16 (2014). 
 181. See Abbvie Inc., 2015 LEXIS 59115, at *16; Schmidt, supra note 180, at 515–16. 
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debates, and divergent holdings will only continue. This Note’s proposed 
model provides guidance for applying Actavis to reverse payment 
settlements, including those with nonmonetary provisions, and analyzing 
the settlement terms for antitrust law violations. Adopting this 
framework would create more consistent holdings while also addressing 
the larger anticompetitive problems at issue. 
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Appendix A: Defined Terms 
 
Brand-name company/manufacturer = The owner of the patent (“patentee”). 
This pharmaceutical company produces and sells the brand-name drug. 
The brand-name company is the party that made the “reverse payment” at 
issue, to a generic drug company, presumably to incentivize the generic company 
to delay sale of its generic version of the brand-name drug. 
Brand-name drug = The pharmaceutical drug produced and sold by the 
brand-name pharmaceutical company. 
Brand-name drugs tend to be fairly expensive during the patent’s term 
because there are no competing drugs in the marketplace. 
Complaint = In this Note, “the complaint” refers to the suit brought by the 
FTC or other interested parties (“plaintiffs”) against the “settling parties” (i.e., 
the brand-name and generic drug companies). In the complaint, the plaintiffs 
allege that the settling parties engaged in anticompetitive behavior (via their 
reverse payment settlement) that violates antitrust law. 
Exclusivity period / marketing exclusivity period = The 180-days of 
marketing exclusivity that the Hatch-Waxman Act grants to the first generic 
company to successfully apply to market a generic version of a brand-name drug, 
through the FDA’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) process. 
It is this 180-day exclusivity period that allows the brand-name and generic 
drug companies to enter into reverse payment settlements that restrain 
competition and preserve the brand-name manufacturer’s monopoly. 
First-filer = The first generic company to file an application with the FDA 
to produce a generic version of an existing brand-name drug. 
Reverse payment settlements are generally between a generic first-filer and 
brand-name pharmaceutical company, with the generic first-filer accepting 
payment to delay release of their generic drug. 
Generic challenger/company = The “first-filer.” The generic company 
initially filed with the FDA to market a generic version of the brand-name drug, 
but then settled with the brand-name company and agreed to delay release of its 
generic drug in exchange for payment. 
Hatch-Waxman Act = Enacted in response to rising pharmaceutical costs, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act aims to speed up the FDA approval process of generic 
drugs. 
However, certain provisions of the Hatch-Waxman, specifically the 180-day 
marketing exclusivity period granted to the generic first-filer, create a scenario 
that allows the settling parties’ to enter into reverse payment settlements that 
delay competition. 
Patent infringement lawsuit = The initial lawsuit, between the brand-name 
drug company and generic company, that triggered the reverse payment 
settlement at issue in the antitrust lawsuit. 
In this initial lawsuit, the brand-name drug company sued the generic 
company for patent infringement. These two “settling parties” then agreed to a 
“reverse payment settlement,” in which the brand-name company paid the 
generic company, presumably to delay release of its generic drug. 
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Patentee = the brand-name pharmaceutical company who owns the patent 
on the drug at issue 
Plaintiffs = The parties bringing the complaint against the settling parties 
for engaging in unlawful anticompetitive behavior through their reverse payment 
settlement. This may be the FTC or other interested parties. 
Reverse payment settlements / Pay for delay settlements = An agreement 
in which a brand-name pharmaceutical company makes a payment to a 
competing company that was attempting to market a generic version of the 
brand-name drug, in the course of a patent infringement settlement. 
Reverse payment settlements raise antitrust concerns because they delay 
the availability of low-cost, generic drugs to consumers. The concern is that the 
payment was an incentive to the generic company to keep its competing drug off 
the market until a specified, delayed date. 
Settling parties = the brand-name pharmaceutical company (the patentee) 
and the generic company (the first-filer) involved in the reverse payment 
settlement at issue. 
The two settling parties are both defendants in the antitrust lawsuit, which 
alleges that their reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law. 
 
 
 
